

Between 'Never Again' and 'No More Hiroshima': War Memory and Politics in Israel and Japan

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In 1973, just months before the Yom Kippur War, Muki Tzur, an Israeli historian, wrote in the introduction of the German translation of "*siach lokhamim*" (a soldiers' conversation), "[this book] was written by Jewish youths of the 20th century. This century was shaped by two colossal events, two earthquakes in modern civilization: Hiroshima and Auschwitz. It seems that there is no young man in this world who is free from relating to these two events...we (young Israelis) are looking for meaning between these two extremities."¹ Haim Guri, one of Israel's leading publicists took offense from Tzur's lining up of the two tragedies. In a biting critique titled *Al ha-hevdel* (on the difference) Guri dismissed any effort of comparison or connection between Hiroshima and Auschwitz. Guri presented Hiroshima as a tragedy but one that was conducted as part of a war in which the Japanese were the aggressors, while the Jews were not in anyway conducting warfare against the Germans. Furthermore, accepting American interpretation of the events, Guri presented Hiroshima as an "evil with a purpose," which was the lesser evil of preventing many more casualties in an event of an invasion. Auschwitz was different. "It had no purpose...it was a crime." Implicitly (and a -historically) condemning the allies, Guri added, "If the A-bomb was dropped on Auschwitz Millions would have been saved." Guri hinted at what was really in stake here when he concluded, " the Germans would be pleased of this false confluence of Hiroshima and Auschwitz."² Thus, implying that the very comparison served to undermine German guilt. In a forceful reply, Tzur answered to Guri, " I cannot forget Hiroshima... not because I could identify with its victims to same degree I could with my own people. Not, also, because I attribute to Truman and his advisers the same Motives I attribute to Eichmann or Heidrich. But because Hiroshima have put us under the threat of a total weapon...we must understand the horrible absurd [which is Hiroshima], even I as Israeli cannot release my self from that shadow."³

Guri's particularism, which is representative of majority opinion in Israel, stands in sharp contrast with the global role Hiroshima and Japan sought to themselves as universal emissaries of peace. This contrast exposes the enormous gap between the two lessons of WW II's horrors, the universal and particularist, which supposedly position Israel and Japan on two opposite poles. However, as Tzur reply demonstrated and as this paper will argue, this contrast, though very real, obscures the many similarities between the way these nations dealt with their tragedy and the many nuanced argument in between these two positions. Furthermore, these similarities are largely the result of the two communities being a part of an emerging global memory culture. This debate, and others which will be examined here, illuminates the global nature of WW II memory. The war was a world war and as such precipitated global development and an emerging global memory culture. The histories of war and commemoration are, to use Sebastian Conrad's words: "entangled histories."⁴ Yet memory studies continue to operate through a "tunnel vision" looking at individual nations in isolation.⁵ What this paper wishes to offer, within the limited space allotted, is to try and go beyond a simple comparison of the two nations in isolation and examine how both histories were entangled and influenced from similar global developments.

In the current format I could only present the case in broad strokes. To demonstrate developments, I'll largely draw on examples for my research which concentrate on Hiroshima and the Holocaust. I offer to look at the emerging global memory space through three historical stages: The first stage, of memory work roughly from 1945 to 1960 was triumphant narratives/divided Memories. The Second stage: the emergence of victim narratives and subsequent nationalization of narratives from the late fifties to the seventies. Finally, The third stage was the coming to the scene of other victim groups who challenged Jews and Japanese claims for unique victimhood. These were not clear stages, neither was this progress linear. This history was messy, multi-directional and open to many interpretations. Yet, what I hope to show is that the existence of global trends is clear.

I. Triumphant narratives/ divided memories

In both countries, and, indeed globally, triumphant narratives which concentrated on transformation and victory initially predominated

commemoration.⁶ Japanese and Israeli (then still pre-state) narratives were of course different kinds of triumphant narratives than the American or other allied ones. It was, indeed, hard for both communities to treat defeat and atomic annihilation or the loss of more than half of one's people in a genocide as any sort of triumph. Indeed, not only for these communities. People everywhere could not grasp the horror of the bomb and camps. Celebration of victory in the war soon gave way to wide spread anxiety. In its extreme, this mood led Mary McCarthy to write of Hiroshima as "a hole in human history."⁷ Auschwitz and the horror of the camps led Theodore Adorno to a similar conclusion about the fate of human culture after the Holocaust. These were horrors beyond our grasp, beyond humanity.

Yet, from the very beginning efforts were made to fill the hole. In both places there was a need on both a very personal and community level to ascribe meaning to the suffering and to integrate this unfathomable event into a familiar history. In both communities narratives of redemption and transformation emerged to give meaning to the tragedy. The nation having suffered now emerged triumphant. The two events became touchstones for a new or rather reinvented national identity of both communities as a phoenix rising from the ashes towards a new, bright (and modern) future. This was a familiar story everywhere, as nations dealt with the legacy of defeat and civil war and sought to redefine the war as a crucible from, which the nation emerged triumphant and stronger.⁸ At the same time what, in all places, these large narratives tried to mask was a very divided and fragmented memory of the war as different groups vied for influence over the emerging cultures of commemoration.⁹ These divides were the result of both local and global struggles, whether ethnic divides or the cold war, which produced dynamic and often fractious debates over memory.

In Japan, the work of explaining the war started almost immediately. In the "shattered Jewel" speech of August 15th the Showa emperor's decision to surrender was portrayed as a magnanimous act. The emperor presented the bomb and American scientific mastery as what brought about the end of the war, not some failure of part of the elites or the utter falseness of talk of *yamato damashi* (spirit of Yamato or of the Japanese race). In what would become a staple of certain sections of the later peace movement, Japan by being A-bombed actually won morally by losing materially as it acquired the peculiar merit of being the only country to experience the bomb.¹⁰ This also worked for the Americans who saw the bomb as a necessary evil but one that

brought peace. The alignment of interests between occupiers and Japanese elites worked for everybody, putting the blame on the war on a few militarists while letting the Emperor and the people off the hook.¹¹ Especially after the 1947, everywhere in Japan the word peace was ubiquitous: adorning everything from the constitution to cigarette brands. There was much optimism and belief in the new democratic Japan and even the communist now saw the US as an army of liberators.

Underneath the optimism there was, of course, much ideological struggle. As Franziska Seraphim demonstrated, war memory developed as part of democratic discourse, involving both civil society and international groups.¹² One major difference between Japan and other countries is that the state backed off from the memorialization scene and left it open to competing groups. Whether Communists, liberals or conservatives, war veterans, *hibakusha* (A-bomb victims) or refugees from Manchuria, groups (and sub groups within these) competed over what would be the "right" interpretation of the war. Whether the war was remembered as an aberration, a war of liberation against the west, or a senseless crime against the people depended very much on where one stood on the ideological spectrum.

Meanings changed fast and were influenced by both international and domestic developments. The development of Hiroshima's memory demonstrate this trend. After a period of severe censorship, Hiroshima City working with American Christian and pacifist backers as well as with other groups, emerged as a symbol of an international peace movement. Hiroshima's "peace," however, was quite inoffensive for Americans. For reasons I explored elsewhere, Hiroshima developed a peace culture which emphasized reconciliation and presented itself as a forward looking modern city.¹³ This Japanese initiative was welcomed by the Americans. But American and Japanese elites' reinvention of Hiroshima as a city of peace, as the city was officially declared to be in 1949, did not keep up with events as Hiroshima potential for subversion and ambivalence kept surfacing. In 1950 with the Korea war and the threat of world war III, the peace narrative received a whole new meaning. That year, Hiroshima's, newly founded, Public Safety Committee banned the August Sixth ceremony on GHQ orders.¹⁴

Japanese conservatives also saw Hiroshima very differently. Nakasone Yasuhiro the figure most responsible for the launching of Japanese atomic energy and who had witnessed the Hiroshima blast, wrote: "I still remember

the image of the white cloud...That moment motivated me to think and act toward advancing the peaceful use of nuclear power." Nakasone believed that if Japan did not participate in "the largest discovery of the twentieth century," it would "forever be a fourth-rate nation."¹⁵

In Israel, David Ben Gurion, Israel founding father, had a similar but darker logic when he set out to acquire a bomb to prevent another Holocaust. This logic was very much related to Ben Gurion and Palestinian Jews feeling of helplessness in face of the Holocaust. Ben Gurion and others in the founding fathers generation lived through the Holocaust in Palestine, seeing and hearing of the slaughter of their people but were completely helpless to prevent it. The feeling of helplessness and even shame, especially in a society which prided itself on its activism and masculine character was translated after the war into the common-sense understanding that "never again," meant being strong. Publicly, commemoration of the Holocaust in Israel, from very early on, emphasized resistance and the importance of being strong to ensure the survival of the state. The victims of the camps and the deportation were seen as somehow failed in achieving this ideal going like "lambs to the slaughter." Yet, underneath all this talk there was much existential anxiety. "They [the Arabs]," wrote Ben Gurion to a survivor, "could slaughter us tomorrow in this country . . . We don't want to reach again the situation that you were in. We do not want the Arab Nazis to come and slaughter us."¹⁶ Furthermore, given the feeble response of the allies to Hitler's extermination of the Jews, so the argument went, Israel would have to be self-reliant.¹⁷

But here as well the transformation narrative masked a struggle over the meaning and interpretation of the Holocaust. Religious interpretations clashed with secular ones. While religious Jews wanted to emphasize martyrdom and incorporate the Holocaust into a tradition of memorialization of pogroms and other religious persecutions that went back to the crusades, seculars wanted to push for a decisively nation centered. For the first decade and a half after the war major commemoration took place on Mt. Zion and the Shoa basement, which featured burned Torah books rather than in the emerging Yad Vahem complex.¹⁸ Yad Vashem also had and still have a bitter rivalry with Kibutz lohamei hagetaot, the later representing Partisan and left wing groups clash with the more "normal" survivor and research oriented institution. Then there were the Jewish internal memory wars between Israel and the diaspora. When compensation money came from Germany the claims

conference withheld money from Yad Vashem for what they saw overtly nationalistic emphasis on “gvura” resistance to the Nazis which overshadowed the rest of the survivors.¹⁹ Survivors’ organizations themselves were torn between former supporters of the *Judenrats* and others and one should mention the Kastner affair and Kapo trials, examined by Tom Segev and others to illustrate this point.²⁰ There was no silence on the Holocaust but constant discord. The stories of the survivor themselves though were silent. Others with larger claims of resistance or religious piety made much more noise.

This story could be seen anywhere. In France and other European countries across the ideological divide the main heroes of the war were the political prisoners and resisters.²¹ Nowhere did the survivors stand in central stage. Big themes of redemption were everywhere of Poland for instance once again serving as the Christ of nations, of the great patriotic war in the USSR or of the triumphant communist party redeeming China from a hundred years of humiliation (forgetting and even silencing the actual victims of Nanking as to not harm its new informal relationship with Japan). One could find also similarly to the Japanese people as victim narrative Austria’s own myth of victimization. In there too a complex history was peppered over with a myth of national victimhood. The same was true of Belgium or Singapore where ethnic tensions and were also hidden under a façade of national victimization and martyrdom.²² Everywhere whether in the East or West, cold war struggles were recast as a continuation of the war. Capitalists turned into Fascists and Nazi and Soviet repression blurred into each other.

This was largely because the world as a whole had to deal with the huge disruption that the bomb, the camps and the war as a whole caused to the narratives of progress and national redemption that dominated the twentieth century. If science and patriotism were supposed to lead us to the Promised Land how could one explain fascism or the bomb. National and personal tragedies had to be explained and given meaning to and that was done through the large themes of liberation, redemption and reassertion of capitalist or socialist narratives both of which were based on progress. Thus, the bomb and the camps were not presented as a failure of the progress narrative but as an aberration, a mistake, or as the result of the mistaken doctrines of the other side.

II. The victims emerge

The new stories postwar states told about themselves changed during the fifties and sixties and this necessitated also new heroes. This happened for various reasons. Whether because the nature of the disaster, as in Israel and Japan, made simple heroic narrative difficult or as other developments, like the rise of peace movements brought victims into center stage. In the fifties and sixties the partisans recede and the victims took the witness stand. In Japan. Which had no partisans, but only a handful of communist resisters, this came earlier in the form of national pacifism. In 1954 and 1955, Following the 1954 Lucky Dragon # Five incident and the radiation scares that came in its wake, the anti-nuclear movement in Japan received a tremendous boost. Millions of Japanese signed petitions, marched and showed solidarity with Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the Lucky Dragon victims. The victims of the bombing, the *hibakusha* took center stage in the movement. The movement was the spring board for unification of the major victim association and saw victims come on stage and tell their stories for the first time to an audience of tens of thousands. The appeals by *hibakusha* galvanized the movement. Pacifists discovered the force of emotional mobilization and witnessing. Soon *hibakusha* were going around the world in the service of the anti-nuclear movement.

Ben Gurion and the Israeli state, incidentally, also discovered this power during the Eichmann trial. The trial which took place in 1961 stood at the center of world attention. This was the first time Holocaust witnesses were widely broadcast, and it caused a transformation in survivors' status in Israel. These were mostly not the partisans or others who were the public figures of the fifties, but just "regular" people. It was only after the Eichmann trial that stories like theirs became popularly appreciated. The trial marked a turning point in Holocaust memory in Israel moving from the divided memory," into the "nationalized memory," of the sixties.²³ . Ironically, these personal stories have led to a nationalization of victimhood; a process that will peak before the six day war. It was before this war and again after 1973 when Israelis felt the most vulnerable and identification with and use of the victims of the Holocaust entered into the mainstream.²⁴

The rise of the victim narrative was also clear in Japan at the time. This is demonstrated by the Eichmann trial itself. When Japanese equated themselves to the Jews as victims of war by equating Nuclear and Nazi terror. This could be seen with many commentators and also in this caricature where the former allies are now Eichmann's replacements. Some Japanese liberals

even went further and implied that they are more “noble” than the Jews as they turned to peace and reconciliation rather than the eye for an eye attitude of the vindictive Jews. Inoue Makoto, in the *Ashai*, went perhaps to the furthest extremes, equating the Israeli court and Nazi crimes: “I can find no more words to defend the Israeli court than I can for [Eichmann’s crimes]. The psychology in this Kangaroo court is the psychology that makes war possible... [and] will lead humankind to destruction.”²⁵



A caricature at the *Yomiuri Shinbun* (April 11th 1961), depicting “Eichmann’s replacements,” who are the four nuclear powers: the USSR, France, the U.K. and the U.S.

With the Vietnam war and the new peace movement another generation was now challenging this view. This is demonstrated by the work of Oda Makoto. Oda was the leader of *beheiren* (betonamuni heiwa o shimin renge — Citizen’s League for Peace in Vietnam) who was one of the first major public figures to confront the fallacy of victim consciousness and publicize the discovery that it blinded Japanese to their own responsibility for past victimizing. The Vietnam War revealed Japan’s complicity in aggressions on the continent. Beheiren and other student groups vehemently opposed blanketing these historical and political realities under the usual abstractions. Oda and other activists directly challenged the victim narrative. When the LDP endorsed anti-nuclearism with the three non nuclear principles (while covertly colluding with America over breaking them) and sent for the first time PM Sato Eisaku to Hiroshima, students stormed the ceremony and

fought pitched battle with the Hiroshima police. On the other hand, resurgence of right wing with a stronger Japan led to strange sights like the JDF marching down peace boulevard in Hiroshima, which they did from the mid sixties to the mid seventies until protest have stopped this bizarre site. Right wing groups also now showed them self in force in Hiroshima and other places and fought with students and others quite regularly.



The Japanese Defense Forces' 13th Armored Division marching down Peace Boulevard, Hiroshima 1965 (source: the *Chgūoku Shinbun*, 27 October 1965)

All of this represented a generational shift as well as an economic and cultural one which one could see also in Germany 1968 moment. Suddenly young Germans and French students were chanting "we are all German Jews." The Auschwitz and other trials as well as the 1967 war, Munich 1973 massacre and other events have brought the Holocaust and the Jews to center stage. Similar developments and awareness in the US, with the use of the Holocaust by both liberals and conservative Jewish groups in the civil right and other struggles also brought the Holocaust to center stage and with it also the survivors.²⁶

Stage III privatization, Americanization, and competing victimhood

But what really changed the scene, and would lead us to the third and most recent stage of this process was the Americanization and privatization of the narratives in the late seventies. With the 1978 television series Holocaust, Claude Lanzman's work and the initiatives for video and other collections that came out of this and other initiatives survivor stories took on a different

meaning. This is the stage where the focus is clearly on the private stories of the survivors. A similar thing was happening in Hiroshima with a boom in testimonies.²⁷ In both places older survivors after retiring facing old age but also no more afraid of discrimination came out and told their stories. The medium of the video camera and television made it so much easier and acceptable. At the same time, as a result of the work of activists, greater access to debates and examples from other parts of the world, and geo-political shifts the voices of other victims than Jews and Japanese starting to come out. Thus, together with privatization came an increasing competition of victims.

In Japan, global debates on war memory that took place around the 1985 and 1995 anniversaries, the death of Hirohito, as well as the end of the Cold War and the rise of China brought war memory forward as a distinct political problem. The problem began in the eighties with the surfacing of the Yasukuni and text book issue and exploded with the comfort woman and debates over Nanking. The reasons for this are complex.

First there was the rise of China and Korea as more assertive economic powers. Especially in China, where nationalism replaced communism as the main justification for the CCP rule, and which now no longer needed Japanese technology and loans as much as it did before, memory issues became explosive. The rise of the right wing and nationalism In a more confident (and in the nineties) fearful Japan turned these periodic spats into vicious circles of escalation with Japanese politicians seemingly unlimited ability to make outrageous remarks just putting more fuel to the fire. The rise of historical revisionism on one hand and a more assertive and internationally minded left wing within civil society also added to this explosive mix.²⁸ The comfort woman issue, which was exposed by Japanese historians than pushed by an international coalition of NGO's demonstrated this dynamic.

A more internationally minded Japanese scene and the rise of the Holocaust as a the paradigm for dealing with the war made an impact on Japan as well. In Hiroshima there were three different Holocaust exhibitions in the seventies and a serious effort at organizing a Holocaust memorial.²⁹ Much of this could be attributed to what Rudi Dutschke termed in the German context, "The students' long march through the institutions," bringing activists students view to mainstream. This happened everywhere as 68' liberals and the movements that came out of the sixties were chaining the cultural scene.³⁰

And now, more than ever events in one location affected others. From the eighties on one see the age an rise of counter memories: Koreans in Hiroshima, Palestinians and Mizrachi Jews in Israel all claimed to bring forward a suppressed past. This reflected on Japan, An effort to commemorate Auschwitz in Hiroshima, which was common sensical in the 1970's, now drew much criticism. Kai Hitoshi, a prominent film director and left-wing activist, wrote on Auschwitz and Hiroshima "there is something that bothers me [in this affair]. Why does Hiroshima qualify for a connection with Auschwitz? If you look at history, don't Nanking or Seoul have better qualifications for connections with Auschwitz? After all, there is something no one said so far: Hiroshima was on the side of the aggressor (was an aggressor city)."³¹

One reaction of the center and right in Israel and Japan was politicization and affirmation of the victim narrative. Menachem Begin, Israeli Prime minister used Holocaust rhetoric when he bombed Saddam Hussein nuclear reactor and invaded Lebanon, settlers used terms like Judenrein when they were forced out of Sinai after the Peace treaty with Egypt. This caused unprecedented debates in Israel. Boaz Evron a historian wrote an article "The Holocaust – a danger to the nation," challenging the notion of the Holocaust's uniqueness and urged the nation to forget it. Amos Oz wrote to Begin: Hitler is already dead Mr. prime minister. One solution for the mainstream to counter both extremes was to affirm the transformation narrative and turn these sites as sacred spaces, as a way out of it one could see that with the memorials themselves and the way they are commemorated.

I would like to leave you with these as they illustrate perfectly the idea of transformation narratives as well as the many ambiguities and different readings possible of both sites. As Amos Goldberg points out, the Yad Vasehmmemorial, its efforts to the contrary notwithstanding, encourages a very particular Zionist reading of the Holocaust and blocks different more nuanced understandings of the tragedy.³² The visitor literally has no escape from the course imposed on her by the monument designer and has to make his way from the dark recesses below the mountain of memory, until the end when the monument opens up into a spectacular view of Jewish Jerusalem and its mountains. Thus, the monument forces the visitor to take the journey from the destruction of the Jewish people to Zionist resurrection. In Hiroshima, a similar path takes the visitor from the A-bomb dome, preserved in its shocking state as it was on August the sixth, through the park, in a

straight line which leads the visitor into the cenotaph and then to the ultra-modern (at the time) concrete buildings of the museum. Here as well, as the architect intended, the visitor takes a journey from destruction to resurrection. In both places, however, ambiguities and ironies abound.³³ As Lisa Yoneyama noted, the A-bomb dome was also the site where a different colonial modernity was on display before the war (the place served to promote Hiroshima's trade with the colonies).³⁴ Thus, reminding the visitor unintentionally what was the price Japan paid for its aggression; an interpretation which is almost completely absent from the memorial. Furthermore, one could also take the journey backward from the museum to the dome; thus, making destruction the end result of modernity. No such freedom is allowed in Jerusalem, where the visitor have only one way to go, but what most visitors do not know is that the gorgeous mountain view they are watching when they exit the memorial also includes the site of Dir Yassin, where hundreds of Palestinians were massacred by Jewish militias. The Jews, consequentially, were not the only victims and this history, for some, did not have a happy ending. Thus, ambiguities and different readings exists side by side with strict conformity , which comes in both places from a shared commitment to a nation-state centered and progress oriented view of history.

Indeed the entangled quality of both events with the cold war, modernity and with each other point out to the messiness and inability to have strict comparison. Comparison however is necessary. Not of the events themselves. Guri, his blistering rhetoric notwithstanding did have a point. One could not compare the Jews and the Japanese as victims or these particular events of mass killings themselves without getting into a moral minefield. Hiroshima was jot a genocide. This does not mean that comparison of mass killings is impossible. Just that it requires much prudence, Furthermore, what we compare here is what happened after and in here comparison of these two different communities to tragedy tell us much about the way our word has dealt with the tragedy of war after 1945. I hope this survey could serve to illuminate a framework which will be useful to the study of not only commemoration but also other histories of our very different yet in strange way very similar countries.³⁵

¹ Quoted at Davar, 29 January 1973.

² Ibid.

Davar, 25 July 1973. Tzur was no pacifist. He was disgusted by a group of Jewish-American students who told him that the “Jewish people chose justice over the politics of force.” Tzur argued that, in the face of destruction, “not to be strong is immoral.”³

⁴ Conrad Sebastian, “Entangled Memories: Versions of the Past in Germany and Japan, 1945–2001,” *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 38, No. 1, Redesigning the Past (Jan., 2003), pp. 86

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ The phrase “triumphant narratives” is from John W. Dower, “Triumphal and Tragic Narratives of the War in Asia,” *The Journal of American History* 82, no. 3 (December 1, 1995): 1124–1135. I use “triumphant slightly differently here.

⁷ John Whittier Treat, *Writing Ground Zero: Japanese Literature and the Atomic Bomb* (University Of Chicago Press, 1996), p.27)

⁸ See Pieter Lagrou, “The Politics of Memory. Resistance as a Collective Myth in Post-war France, Belgium and the Netherlands, 1945–1965,” *European Review* 11, no. 04 (2003): 527–549.

⁹ Jolande Withuis and Annet Mooij, *The Politics of War Trauma: The Aftermath of World War II in Eleven European Countries* (Amsterdam University Press, 2011).

¹⁰ The emperor himself would to reiterate this when he visited Hiroshima on, the very significant date, of December 7th 1946. In here too the emperor was affirming the very American equation of Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima, albeit from the stance of a victimized Japan that paid dearly for its sins.

¹¹ Classic account of this is in John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 1st ed. (W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), pp. 489-490

¹² Franziska Seraphim, *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945-2005* (Harvard University Asia Center, 2006), p.5

¹³ See Ran Zwigenberg, “The Bright Flash of Peace: Hiroshima in the World, 1945-1995.”

Unpublished Phd Dissertation, The CUNY Graduate Center, (2012).

¹⁴ This day [August 6th],” went the committee’s declaration, “should be day for silent prayer and not as the peace movement try to make it as a cover for anti occupation activities.” The committee further called on residents, “not to participate in these anti Japanese criminal activities.” See Hiroshima Shi, “Shimin no mina sama he,” Hiroshima Memorial Museum Archive, Kawamoto Collection, Folder 37. See also Hiroshima-ken (Japan), Hiroshima-ken (Japan), *Genbaku Sanjūnen: Hiroshima-ken No Sengoshi*, Dai 1-han. (Hiroshima-shi: Hiroshima-ken, 1976), p. 198.

¹⁵ Quoted in Ran Zwigenberg, “‘The Coming of a Second Sun’: The 1956 Atoms for Peace Exhibit in Hiroshima and Japan’s Embrace of Nuclear Power,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal* Vol. 10, Issue 6 No 1, February 6, 2012.

¹⁶ Tom Segev, *Ha'milion ha'shviat: yisraelim veba'shooa*, (Tel Aviv: Domino Publishing, 1991), p. 369.

¹⁷ See *ibid.* Also, Yoel Rappael (ed.) *Zikaron galui – Zikaron Samui: Toodat ha-shoa be medinat yisrael*, (Tel-Aviv: Massuah, 1998); Idith Zertal, *Ha'auma vehamavet: historia, zicharon, politika*. (Tel Aviv: Dvir Press, 2002).

¹⁸ Doron Bar, “Holocaust Commemoration in Israel During the 1950s: The Holocaust Cellar on Mount Zion,” *Jewish Social Studies* 12, no. 1 (2005): 16.

¹⁹ Roni Stauber, *The Holocaust in Israeli Public Debate in the 1950s: Ideology and Memory* (Valentine Mitchell, 2007).

²⁰ Segev, pp 259-262.

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- ²¹ Lagrou, "The Politics of Memory. Resistance as a Collective Myth in Post-war France, Belgium and the Netherlands, 1945–1965."
- ²² Ran Shauli, "Massacres and Political Amnesia: On the Political Value of Memory of Massacres in the Chinese Communities of Malasaya, Indonesia, and Singapore (1941-1998)," Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Haifa (2008).
- ²³ Cited in Hanna Yablonka, "Mishpat Eichmann ve'ha'yisraelim: me'ketz 40 shana." in <http://lib.cet.ac.il/pages/item.asp?item=16244&author=1916> accessed 12 February 2011
- ²⁴ Daniel Gutwein, "The Privatization of the Holocaust: Memory, Historiography, and Politics," *Israel Studies* 14, no. 1 (2009): 36–64.
- ²⁵ Quoted in David G. Goodman and Masanori Miyazawa, *Jews in the Japanese Mind: The History and Uses of a Cultural Stereotype* (Lexington Books, 2000), p. 152
- ²⁶ Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life* (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2000). Michael E. Staub, *Torn at the Roots: The Crisis of Jewish Liberalism in Postwar America* (Columbia University Press, 2004).
- ²⁷ Lisa Yoneyama, *Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory* (University of California Press, 1999).
- ²⁸ Yinan He, "History, Chinese Nationalism, and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict." *Journal of Contemporary China* 16, no. 50 (February 2007), pp. 1-24.
- ²⁹ Ran Zwigenberg, "Bright Flash of Peace," chapter 6.
- ³⁰ Kristin Ross, *May '68 and Its Afterlives* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002)
- ³¹ *Asahi Shinbun*, February 16th 1990
- ³² Amos Goldberg, "The 'Jewish narrative' in the Yad Vashem global Holocaust museum," *Journal of Genocide Research* 14/2 (June 2012), p. 187
- ³³ Kenzō Tange, who was responsible for Hiroshima's city plan, as well as the building of the Hiroshima memorial museum, saw his work as one of spiritual transformation. Spiritual renewal would come through "the making of Hiroshima into a factory for peace" (*heiwa wo tsukuridasu no tame kōgyō de aritai*). Le Corbusier, Tange's inspiration, famously used the phrase a "machine for living." See Kenzō Tange, "Hiroshima heiwa kinen tōshi ni kankei shite," in *Kenchiku zasshi*, (October, 1949), p. 42. Le Corbusier famously used the phrase a "machine for living."
- ³⁴ Lisa Yoneyama, "Memory Matters: Hiroshima's Korean Atom Bomb Memorial and the Politics of Ethnicity," in Laura Elizabeth Hein and Mark Selden, *Living with the bomb: American and Japanese cultural conflicts in the Nuclear Age* (M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 202